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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Certainly we cannot say that the changes contemplated here are
imminent. They are suggested as a possible means through which
the delay and expense of redress may be mitigated, and the consumer
protected, assuming, of course, that such protection is desirable.
The public has, by banding together into various purchaser
organizations, gone far in solving the problem of protecting the con-
sumer.68  The remaining solutions, if there are to be any, are in the
hands of the legislature.
EDYTHE R. DUCKER.
THE PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION ON MINIMUM WAGES AND
HOURS.
Regardless of its political sanction, the modem philosophy is con-
cerned with the most good for the most people.
"Where there is no express command or prohibition, but only
general language or policy to be considered, the conditions pre-
vailing at the time of its adoption must have their due rights;
but the changed social, economic and governmental conditions
and ideas of the time, as well as the problems which the changes
have produced, must also logically enter into the considerations,
and become influential factors in the settlement of problems of
construction and interpretation." '
The power conferred upon Congress "to regulate commerce with
the foreign nations and among the several states * * *" 2 was first
discussed by the Supreme Court in the case of Gibbons v. Ogden 3 on
March 2, 1824.
One hundred and thirteen years later a new import was given to
the interstate commerce clause when the Black-Connelly Bill 4 was
introduced to provide for the establishment of fair labor standards in
employments in and affecting interstate commerce. 5
Soule, Consumer Protection (1921) 4 ENcYc. Soc. Sci. 282.
1Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 349-350, 133 N. W. 209 (1911), per
Chief Justice Winslow.2 U. S. CONsT. Art. III, § 8.
39 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23 (U. S. 1824).
'75th Cong., 1st Sess., Union Calendar No. 535, S. 2475, REP. No. 1452
(Aug. 2, 1937, in the House of Representatives).
'In what may be considered as groundwork to this Bill, President Roose-
velt's message to Congress on May 24, 1937, declared: "One third of our
population, the overwhelming majority of which is in agriculture or industry,
is ill-nourished, ill-clad, and ill-housed. * * *. Today you and I are pledged to
take further steps to reduce the lag in the purchasing power of industrial
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Democracy, conscious of a social obligation under modem politi-
cal philosophy, is seeking to enlarge the scope of existing machinery
to accomplish that end. It is our purpose to determine the possible
success of that action.
Provisions of the Proposed Bill.
An act 6 has been proposed in the Congress of the United States
to regulate hours and wages under the commerce clause of the Con-
stitution. The proposed legislation affects employees engaged in inter-
state commerce or in producing, transporting, or otherwise working
on goods transported or sold, or intended for transportation or sale
in interstate commerce, or shipped, delivered, or sold with knowledge
that shipment, delivery or sale in interstate commerce is intended, or
employed in any process or occupation necessary to the production of
such goods; or engaged in the local production of goods which com-
pete to a substantial extent with goods produced in another state and
sold or transported in interstate commerce.7 The Bill operates in
cases where "substandard labor conditions" exist. A "substandard
labor condition" is one under which any employee is now employed
at "oppressive wages," i.e., a wage lower than the minimum fixed by
the board." Subject to exceptions in the discretion of the board, an
"oppressive workweek" shall not result in a "substandard labor con-
dition" if time and a half is paid for overtime.9 "Unfair goods"
workers and to strengthen and stabilize the markets for the farmer's products.
The two go hand in hand. Each depends for its effectiveness upon the other.
Both working simultaneously will open new outlets for productive capital. Our
nation so richly endowed with natural resources and with a capable and indus-
trious population should be able to devise ways and means of insuring to all our
able bodied working men and women a fair day's pay for a fair day's work.
A self stpporting and self respecting democracy can plead no justification for
the existence of child labor, no economic reason for chiseling workers' wages
or stretching workers' hours."
Address to Congress on July 15, 1937 by Hugo L. Black: "Our present
economy of scarcity is not due to a scarcity of goods, or a scarcity of labor, but
to a scarcity of purchasing power among the underpaid and the unemployed.
There are plenty of workers now unemployed willing and anxious to produce
more goods. There are plenty of farmers willing and anxious to produce more
foodstuffs. The difficulty is that there are not enough workers who have the
money to purchase the things they need. Economic. theory is sound only insofar
as it explains and accounts for economic fact. The pseudoeconomic theory,
that shorter hours and higher wages reduces production, fails to explain why
some workers should be toiling long hours at starvation wages when others
cannot find work, and further it fails to explain why a third of the population
should not have adequate purchasing power to acquire the necessities of civilized
life when millions now unemployed would be happy to produce those necessities
if given half a chance Indeed the theory that shorter hours and higher wages
will limit production is based on the assumption that our working population
is fully employed, and this assumption as everyone knows, is wholly incorrect."
See note 4, supra.7 § 2(a) (11), (14), (15), (17), and §§ 7 and 8 (a).
§2 (a), (8), (9) and (11).
°§6 (a).
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whose transportation in interstate commerce is made unlawful, com-
prise goods, wares, products, commodities, merchandise or articles or
subjects of commerce of any kind in any step of whose production
employees have been employed under a "substandard labor condition"
in any occupation, including "any process or occupation necessary to
the production thereof." 10
The "fair labor standards" prescribed pursuant to the Bill are
made operative principally by the following means:
1-by making it unlawful to transport or cause to be transported
or to ship, deliver or sell with knowledge that shipment or delivery
or sale thereof in interstate commerce is intended 1 any "unfair
goods"; 12
2-by making it unlawful to employ under any "substandard
labor conditions" any employee engaged in interstate commerce or in
the production of goods intended for transportation or sale in viola-
tion of (1) above; 13
3-by making it unlawful to employ any employee in violation of
an order of the board requiring the maintenance of fair labor stan-
dards in the intrastate production of goods competing with goods from
other states produced under such fair labor standards; 14
4--by authorizing the board to apply for injunctions to prevent
a threatened violation of any provision of the Bill or of any labor
standard or to enforce compliance with a labor standard order; 1"
5-by making null and void any agreement made in violation of
or binding any person to waive compliance with, any provision of the
Bill or of a regulation or order of the board; 16
6-by giving a cause of action to employees to recover from their
employers as "reparation" the excess of applicable minimum wages
"§2 (a) (14), (15) and (17).
"The unlawfulness of certain of the acts declared illegal by Section 7 of
the Bill is predicated upon the fact that goods are "intended" for shipment in
interstate commerce. To this extent, the Bill would be subject to attack since
the Supreme Court has said that the fact "that commodities produced or manu-
factured within a state are intended to be sold or transported outside the state
does not render their production or manufacture subject to federal regulation
under the commerce clause". Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 301-302,
56 Sup. Ct. 855 (1936). See also Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S.
245, 259-260, 43 Sup. Ct. 83 (1922) ; Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 526, 6 Sup.
Ct. 475 (1886).
-§7 (1).
§7 (2).
"§8 (a) and (b).
"§ 13.
"§ 17.
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over those actually paid and compensation at time and a half for work
in excess of applicable maximum hour standards, less any amount
already paid for such excess time. 7 Any person who wilfully per-
forms any act declared unlawful by the Bill or who wilfully fails to
perform any act, duty or obligation required by the Bill to be per-
formed is made guilty of a misdemeanor. The employment of such
employee under substandard conditions is made a separate offense.' 8
Common carriers are specifically relieved from liability for transport-
ing unfair goods in the regular course of business. 19
Thus, premised upon the federal power to regulate interstate
commerce, the proposed legislation to establish wage and hour stan-
dards contemplates economic, social and administrative innovations the
purpose of which in the words of President Roosevelt,20 is "to im-
prove * * * the standards of living of those who are now undernour-
ished, poorly clad, and ill-housed" and "to extend the frontier of
social progress."
As it now stands, the Bill is a direct prohibition against shipment
in interstate commerce of goods produced under substandard labor
conditions. 2'
The Proposed Bill and Existing Case Law.
Subdivision 1 of subsection A unfortunately proffers a ready op-
portunity to those looking for an excuse to cut down the Bill. It
must be admitted that the true inspiration of the Bill is not to regu-
late interstate commerce as is declared, 22 but is to promote conditions
beneficial to the "physical and economic health, efficiency and well
being * * *" of the workers of the several states. The mechanism
under which this purpose is attempted to be brought under the com-
,§ 18 (a) and (b).
s§ 23 (a).
2' § 20.
-Address to Congress by President Roosevelt on May 24, 1937.
SUnderpart 1 of legislative declarations the Bill says: "Section 1. A-The
employment of workers under substandard labor conditions in occupations in
interstate commerce, in the production of goods for interstate commerce, or
otherwise directly affecting interstate commerce, 1-causes interstate commerce
and the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce to be used to
spread and perpetuate among the workers of the several states conditions detri-
mental to the physical and econwmic health, efficiency, and well being of such
workers; 2--directly burdens interstate commerce; 3-constitutes an unfair
method of competition in interstate commerce; 4-leads to labor disputes bur-
dening and obstructing the free flow of goods in interstate commerce; and
5-directly interferes with the, orderly and fair marketing of goods in interstate
commerce. B-The correction of such conditions directly affecting interstate
commerce requires that the Congress exercise its legislative power to regulate
commerce among the several states by prohibiting the shipment in interstate
commerce of goods produced under substandard labor conditions and by pro-
viding for the elimination of substandard labor conditions in occupations in and
directly affecting interstate commerce.!
'§ 1 (a), 2, 3, 4 and 5.
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merce clause is exactly the same as that declared unconstitutional in
the case of Hammer v. Dagenhart.23  The court therein said that it
appears from the act itself that the purpose and effect of the act is to
prevent the employment of children, and not to safeguard or promote
commerce or the interests of persons or communities in the states into
which children-made goods might be sent.
Another attempt to give legal countenance to the real purpose of
the act was also ruled out in the Child Labor Tax case.24 'The case
held that an act of Congress which clearly, on its face, is designed to
penalize and ihereby to discourage or suppress conduct, the regulation
of which is reserved by the Constitution exclusively to the states can
not be sustained under the federal taxing power by calling the penalty
a tax.2 5  This case is essentially like the Hammer v. Dagenhart 26
case since Congress substantially said that a person in employment of
children, should, instead of having his goods shut out of interstate
commerce as the statute of 1916 had provided, be subjected to a so-
called tax of ten per cent on all the profits of his business additional
to all other taxes. Thus the court made manifest its view that the
provisions of the so-called taxing act must be naturally and reasonably
adapted to the collection of the tax and not solely for the achievement
of some other purpose plainly within state power.2 7
In United States v. Butler 28 Mr. Justice Roberts, writing for the
majority of the court, said that "it is inaccurate and misleading to
speak of the exaction from processors prescribed by the challenged
act as a tax, or to say that as a tax it is subject to no infirmity. A tax,
in the general understanding of the term, and as used in the Constitu-
tion, signifies an exaction for the support of the Government. The
word has never been thought to connote the expropriation of money
'247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529 (1918).
-' Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20, 42 Sup. Ct. 449 (1922).
" Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 19 L. ed. 482 (U. S. 1869) ; McCray
v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 24 Sup. Ct. 769 (1904) ; Flint v. Stone Tracy
Co., 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342 (1910); United States v. Doremus, 249
U. S. 86, 39 Sup. Ct. 214 (1919) distinguished. This case was on the validity
of the Narcotic Drug Act, 38 STAT. 785, which imposed a special tax on the
manufacture, importation and sale or gift of opium or coca leaves, or their
compounds or derivatives. It required every person subject to the special tax
to register with the Collector of Internal Revenue his name and place of busi-
ness, and forbade him to sell except upon the written order of the person to
whom the sale was made on a form prescribed by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. The vendor was required to keep the order for two years, and the
purchaser to keep a duplicate for the same time and both were to be subject
to official inspection. Similar requirements were made to sales upon prescrip-
tions of a physician, and as to the dispensing of such drugs directly to a
patient by the physician. The validity of a special tax in the nature of an
excise tax on the manufacture, sale and importation of such drugs was, of
course, unquestioned. The provision for subjecting the sale and distribution of
the drugs to official supervision and inspection were held to have a reasonable
relation to the enforcement of the tax and were therefore held valid.
' See note 23, siupra.
'United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86, 39 Sup. Ct. 214 (1919).
297 U. S. 1, 61, 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (1936).
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from one group for the benefit of another. We may concede that the
latter sort of imposition is constitutional when imposed to effectuate
regulation of a matter in which both groups are interested and in
respect of which there is a power of legislative regulation. But mani-
festly rio justification for it can be found unless as an integral part
of such regulation. The exaction cannot be wrested out of its set-
ting, denominated an excise for raising revenue and legalized by ig-
noring its purpose as a mere instrumentality for bringing about a de-
sired end. To do this would be to shut our eyes to what all others
than we can see and understand."
The proposed Bill would, in practical effect permit the Federal
Government to regulate wages and hours and other working condi-
tions not only of employees engaged in interstate commerce, but of
the great majority of those engaged in intrastate commerce, to the
necessary exclusion of state regulation thereof. That Congress may
not directly deal with wages and hours of employees not engaged in
interstate commerce was held recently in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.29
That it may do so indirectly in the manner proposed by this Bill is
far from clear. To permit such result the Supreme Court would not
only have to reverse Hammer v. Dagenhart3 0 but go further and
enunciate an entirely new doctrine as to federal control over the local
affairs of the states through indirect exercise of the commerce power.
This latter inference seems apparent since the Bill contemplates fed-
eral regulation of wholly intrastate production merely because goods
so produced compete to a "substantial extent" with goods sold in
interstate commerce.
Before proceeding it becomes necessary to discuss the Act of
July 24, 1935, known as the Ashurst Sumners Act,81 which makes it
"298 U. S. 238, 56 Sup. Ct. 855 (1936) (This case discussed the constitu-
tionality of the Bituminous Coal Act which declares that the mining and distri-
bution of such coal are so affected with a national public interest, and so related
to the general welfare that the industry should be regulated. It -recites that
such regulation is necessary because interstate commerce is directly and detri-
mentally affected by the state of the industry and its practices, and that the right
of the miners to organize and collectively bargain for wages, hours of labor
and working conditions should be guaranteed. Held, the provisions of the Act
looking to the control of wages, hours and working conditions of the miners
engaged in the production of coal, and seeking to guarantee their rights of
collective bargaining in these matters are beyond the powers of Congress
because: 1-Congress has no general power to regulate for the promotion of the
general welfare. Congress can claim no powers that are not granted to it by
the Constitution, and the powers actually granted must be such as are expressly
given, or given by necessary implication). Martin v. Hunters Lessee, 1 Wheat.
304, 326, 4 L. ed. 97 (U. S. 1816). Compare Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U. S. 11, 22, 25 Sup. Ct. 358 (1905). 2-The power expressly granted to Con-
gress to regulate interstate commerce does not include the power to control the
conditions in which coal is produced before it becomes an article of commerce.
3-The effect of interstate commerce in the coal labor conditions involved in
its production is an indirect effect.
' See note 23, supra.
149 STAT. 494 (1935).
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unlawful to transport in interstate or foreign commerce goods made
by convict labor into any state where the goods are intended to be
received, possessed, sold or used in violation of its laws. This Act
was held constitutional in Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois
Central R. R. Co. 32 We can distinguish this from the Hammer v.
Dagenhart case 3 in that Congress may permit interstate transporta-
tion from being used to bring into a state articles which are innocuous
in themselves, but the local traffic in which, because of its harmful
consequences has been constitutionally forbidden by the state. It is
true that in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corporation,34 decided in April, 1937, the Supreme Court up-
held a federal statute,35 requiring employers to negotiate, but not to
enter into any agreement with employees, as applied to a manufac-
turing concern which carried on its business on a national scale. But
clearly, to sustain the present Bill the Supreme Court would have to
go much farther than in case of the Wagner Act.3 6 That Act rep-
resents a direct exercise of the commerce power. This Bill seeks by
an indirect exertion of that power to regular working conditions not
only of employees engaged in interstate commerce but also of em-
ployees engaged in intrastate commerce, and this without regard to
whether the activities of the latter directly burden or affect interstate
commerce.
From a consideration of the foregoing it becomes evident that
any attempt to validate the proposed Bill on the basis of existing case
law is futile. But an attempt may be made to uphold the constitu-
tionality of the Bill on other grounds: namely, to decide that the
mechanism used in all these cases, and heretofore held unconstitu-
tional, is within the commerce clause in the light of a favorable inter-
pretation based on the historical reasons for the formation of the Con-
stitution. President Roosevelt in an address 37 asking for federal
regulation of hours and wages said: "Nearly twenty years ago in his
dissenting opinion in Hammer v. Dagenhart,38 Mr. Justice Holmes
expressed his views as to the power of the Congress to prohibit the
shipment in interstate or foreign commerce of the product of the labor
of children in factories below what Congress then deemed to be civil-
ized social standards. Surely the experience of the last twenty years
has only served to reinforce the wisdom and the rightness of his views.
And, surely if he was right about the power of the Congress over the
work of children in factories, it is equally right that the Congress has
the power over decent wages and hours in those same factories. We
said: I had thought that the propriety of the exercise of a power ad-
299 U. S. 334, - Sup. Ct. -, 81 L. ed. 183 (1937).
'See note 23, supra.
'301 U. S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615 (1936).
' NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT Of July 5, 1935, 49 STAT. 449, 29
U. S. C. § 151.
"See note 35, supra.
'See note 20, supra.
" See note 23, supra.
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mitted to exist in some cases was for the consideration of Congress
alone and that this Court had always disavowed the right to intrude
its judgment upon policy or morals. It is not for this Court to pro-
nounce when prohibition is necessary to regulation if it ever may be
necessary-to say that it is permissible as against strong drink but not
as against the product of ruined lives.
"The Act does not meddle with anything belonging to the
states. They may regulate their internal affairs and their do-
mestic commerce as they like. But when they seek to send
their products across the state line they are no longer within
their rights. If there were no Constitution and no Congress
their power to cross the line would depend on their neighbors.
Under the Constitution such commerce belongs not to the
states but to Congress to regulate. It may carry out its views
of public policy whatever indirect effect they may have upon
the activities of the states. Instead of being encountered by a
prohibitive tariff at her boundaries the state encounters the
public policy of the United States which it is for Congress to
express.3 9 The public policy of the United States is shaped
with a view to the benefit of the Nation as a whole * * * The
national welfare as understood by Congress may require a dif-
ferent attitude within its sphere from that of some self seeking
state. It seems to me entirely constitutional for Congress to
enforce its understanding by all the means at its command.
"Mr. Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Clark, and Mr. Justice
McKenna agreed. A majority of the Supreme Court, how-
ever, decided five to four against Mr. Justice Holmes and laid
down a rule of constitutional law which has ever since driven
into impractical distinctions and subterfuge all attempts to as-
sert the fundamental power of the National government over
interstate commerce.
"But although Mr. Tustice Holmes spoke for a minority
of the Supreme Court he spoke for a majority of the American
people." 40
An Attempt to Uphold the Constitutionality Under a Liberal
Interpretation of the Commerce Clause.
Perhaps the most significant reason for the formation of the
Constitution was the lack of harmony among the several states. One
of the primary purposes of the formation of our Federal Union was
to do away with trade barriers between the states. To the Congress
and not to the states was given the power to regulate commerce among
'Italics ours.
"0 Italics ours.
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the several states. Congress can not interfere in local affairs, but,
when goods pass through the channels of commerce from one state
into another, they become subject to the power of the Congress and
the Congress may exercise that power to recognize and protect the
fundamental interests of free labor. Any attempt to arrive at the real
meaning of the commerce clause without observing the reasons for
its inclusion in the Constitution of the United States, and its history
in the Constitutional Convention would be futile.
The want of the power to regulate commerce was a leading de-
fect of the Confederation. In the different states,- the most opposite
and conflicting regulations existed; each pursued its own real or sup-
posed local interests; each was jealous of the rivalry of its neighbors;
and each was successively driven to retaliatory measures in order to
satisfy public clamor, or to alleviate private distress. In the end,
however, all their measures became utterly nugatory, or mischievous,
engendering mutual hostilities, and prostrating all their commerce at
the feet of foreign nations. It is hardly possible to exaggerate the
oppressed and degraded state of domestic commerce, manufactures
and agriculture, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. It
was easy to foresee that this state of things could not long exist, with-
out bringing on a border warfare, and a deep rooted hatred among
neighboring states, fatal to the Union, and, of course, fatal also to the
liberty of every member in it.41
'STORY, THE CONSTITUTION (1863) 108 ("It was the want of any power
to regulate commerce, as between the states themselves, and with foreign
nations, which as much, and I am not sure but I am justified in saying more,
than any one thing, forced the states to form the present Constitution in lieu
of the Articles of Confederation under which they had won their freedom and
established their independence. It is difficult now for us to fully appreciate
how strong was the tendency to separate, to quarrel, and to bring their adverse
interests into collision, which grew out of the want of any general power in the
Federal Government, as it then existed, to control the commercial relations of
the states with each other.") MILLER, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES, notes by J. C. Bancroft Davis; SIMON STERNE, CONSTITUTIONAL HIS-
TORY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (Rev. ed. 1888) 433;
THE FEDERALIST, Number XLII (" * * * a very material object of this power
was the relief of the states which import and extort through other states, from
the improper contributions levied on them by the latter. Were these at liberty
to regulate the trade between state and state, it must be foreseen, that ways
would be found Put, to load the articles of import and export, during the
passage through their jurisdictions, with duties which would fall on the makers
of the latter, and the consumers of the former. We may be assured, by past
experience,, that such a practice would be introduced by future contrivances;
and both by that and a common knowledge of human affairs, that it would
nourish unceasing animosities, and not improbably terminate in serious interrup-
tions of the public tranquillity.") ; in ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CON-
STITUTION (Vol. 5, 1907) p. 119, Madison said, "The want of authority in Con-
gress to regulate commerce had produced in foreign nations, particularly Great
Britain, a monopolizing policy, injurious to the trade of the United States, and
destructive to their navigation; the imbecility and anticipated dissolution of the
Confederacy extinguishing all apprehensions of a countervailing policy on the
part of the United States. The same want of a general power over commerce
led to an exercise of the power, separately, by the states, which not only proved
[ VOL. 12
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The tendency of the times is necessarily to weaken the power of
the state on the allegiance of the individual, and to lead to a greater
and greater consolidation and unity of interest of the whole United
States. This tendency is still further accelerated by the inability on
the part of the individual states to deal with the economic and social
questions which necessarily arise from the extension of the means of
intercommunication between the states, and the necessity for the ex-
tension of a general power to deal with them. Congress is authorized
to regulate commerce; to make such arrangements in relation to the
commerce, resting on mutual comity as exigencies may from time to
time demand. As the several states have shown themselves power-
less to deal with the subject either in an efficient way or upon a uni-
form plan, the power of the United States to regulate these gigantic
enterprises is well lodged in Congress.4
abortive, but engendered rival, conflicting, and angry regulations. Besides the
vain attempts to supply their respective treasuries by imposts, which turned
their commerce into the neighboring ports, and to coerce a relaxation of the
British monopoly of the West India navigation, which was attempted by
Virginia (see the Journal of her Legislature), the states having ports for
foreign commerce taxed and irritated the adjoining states trading through them
-as New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and South Carolina. Some of the
states, as Connecticut, taxed imports from others, as from Massachusetts,
which complained in a letter to the executive of Virginia, and doubtless to
those of other states. In sundry instances, as of New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Maryland, the navigation laws treated the citizens of other
states as aliens. In certain cases, the authority of the Confederacy was dis-
regarded-as in violation, not only of the treaty of peace, but of treaties with
France and Holland; which were complained of to Congress. In other cases,
the federal authority was violated by treaties and wars with Indians, as by
Georgia; by troops raised and kept up without the consent of Congress, as
by Massachusetts; by compacts without the consent of Congress, as between
Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and between Virginia and Maryland. From the
legislative Journals of Virginia, it appears that a vote refusing to apply for a
sanction of Congress was followed by a vote against the communication of the
compact to Congress. In the internal administration of the states, a violation
of contracts had become familiar, in the form of depreciated paper made a
legal tender, of property substituted for money, of instalment laws, and of the
occlusions of the courts of justice, although evident that all such interferences
affected the rights of other states, relatively creditors, as well as citizen creditors
within the state. Among the defects which had been severely felt, was want of
a uniformity in cases requiring it, as laws of naturalization and bankruptcy; a
.coercive authority operating on individuals; and a guarantee of the internal
tranquillity of the states. * * * Such were the defects, the deformities, -the
diseases, and the ominous prospects, for which the Convention Were to provide
a remedy, and which ought never to be overlooked in expounding and appreciat-
ing the constitutional charter, the remedy that was provided."
"2 STERNE, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND PoLTicAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES (Rev. ed. 1888) 324; SYDNEY GEORGE FISHER, THE EVOLUTION
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1910) 225 ("The regula-
tion of commerce is a most interesting addition and development. As commerce
increased in the course of years its regulation became of more and more impor-
tance, and in the end the necessity for this regulation was one of the most
important causes of Federalism. In fact the convention which framed the
national constitution of 1787 was origially called merely for the pIurpose of
regulating the commerce between the state that bordered om Chesapeake Bay,
1938 ]
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Conclusions.
Matters relating to the public harmony can never be finally cata-
logued. 48 In the Lottery case 44 it was held that lottery tickets are
subjects of traffic among those who choose to buy and sell them and
their carriage by independent carriers from one state to another is
therefore interstate commerce which Congress may prohibit under its
power to regulate commerce among the several states. Legislation
under that power may sometimes and properly assume the form, or
have the effect, of -prohibition. Legislation prohibiting the carriage of
such tickets is not inconsistent with any limitation or restrction im-
posed.upon the exercise of the powers granted to Congress. Another
example of a prohibition of interstate commerce for industrial rea-
sons is in the quarantine of cattle fit enough as food in themselves but
likely to damage the cattle industry in the receiving 45 state. It has
been said in McCray v. United States 46 that the Court will not re-
strain the exercise of a lawful power on the assumption that a wrong-
ful purpose or motive -kas caused the power to be exerted.
Thus the rules as to such matters seem to be elastic and incapable
of rigid definition ;47 if so, our legal system cannot be convicted of im-
and no more important clause was placed in the national document than that
which gave Congress the power to, 'regulate commerce * * *'"). (Italics
ours.)
The sixth resolution proposed by Mr. Randolph at the Constitutional Con-
vention on May 19, 1787, was, "Resolved that * * * and moreover to legislate
in all cases to which the separate states are incompetent, or in which the
harnony of the United States -iay be interrupted by the exercise of individual
legislation * * *." (Italics ours.) The debates in and proceedings of the
Framers' Convention, in so far as they preserved and published, evince that it
was the intention of the makers of the Constitution to vest in the National
Government complete authority over external affairs. See SUTHERLAND, CoN-
STITUTIONAL POWERS AND WORLD AFFAIRS (1919) 41.
' Essence of speech by Lord Buckmaster in the House of Lords in London
Association, &c. v. Greenland, 114 L. T. Rep. 434 (1916).
"188 U. S. 321, 23 Sup. Ct. 321 (1903).
"Missouri, Kansas, and Texas Ry. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 623, 18 Sup.
Ct. 488 (1898).
" 195 U. S. 27, 24 Sup. Ct. 769 (1904).
4 7 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1920), Law and
the Court, speech given at a dinner of the Harvard Law School on Feb. 15,
1913. "I have no belief in panaceas and almost none in sudden ruin. I believe
with Montesquieu that if the chance of a battle-I may add, the passage of a
law-has ruined a state, there was general cause at work that made the state
ready to perish by a single battle or a law. Hence I am not much interested
one way or the other in the nostrums now so strenuously urged. I do not think
that the United States would come to an end if we lost our power to declare
an act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperilled if we could
not make that declaration as to the laws of the several states. For one in my
place sees how often local policy prevails with those who are not trained to
national views and how often action is taken that embodies what the commerce
clause was wont to end. But I am not aware that there is any serious desire
to limit the Court's power in this regard. For most of the things that properly
can be called evils in the present state of the law I think the main remedy, as for
the evils of public opinion, is for its to grow more civilized." (Italics ours.)
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perfection or inconsistency by showing that different views are held
at different times. Our answer to the critics who bring such a charge
is that we are consistently inconsistent, and refuse to lay down fixed
and unchangeable rules on this topic of public interest, and do the
same in other fields. It is inevitable, or at least unlikely, that with
the changing circumstances of the world and human society, the
changing needs and interests of human development and social and
economic structure and safety, the judicial view of these highly im-
portant matters will change. Judges cannot stand apart from the
world in which they live.
No unit of an entire whole is any greater or of any more signifi-
cance than the whole of which it is a component part. And the whole
can only function when its actions or mandates affect, with equal
force, each integral unit within its body. It was in recognition of
this truism that the harmony clause must have been contained in the
Constitution.
Four score less two years ago, our forefathers engaged in a con-
flict which determined for all time that the states of this Union were
bound together in an organization which was to be directed by one
central power. The extent of that power is defined by the delegated
powers from the states to the National Government. One of these
delegated powers was the right to pass laws as shall promote the har-
mony and welfare of the states.
Today the need for a minimum wages and hours bill is pro-
nounced. Exploitation is fostered by local governments who advertise
the low salary rate to be enjoyed by manufacturers seeking to avoid
union-ridden municipalities. Competition by chambers of commerce
in this line has reached the point where the floor mat worker is being
used as a platform from which platform the chambers may beckon to
manufacture.
The war between the states determined more effectively than any
constitutional convention that a question of economic import, national
in its scope, was amenable to national administration. A wages and
hours bill, locally legislated, has for its only foundation the desidera-
tum of local administration. The need for such a bill is apparent.
The proposed bill provides for local administration, thereby answering
the purpose local legislation would fulfill. We needn't repair to
Delphi to predict that to leave the local agencies to legislate on the
subject will permit of the refusal of some localities so to do; and in
such instances, the structure must fall. It is submitted that because
the bill is necessary for the most good for the most people-that the
harmony among the people of the states as well as among the states
themselves necessitates national legislation on the subject. The Con-
gress of the United States may manifest the desirability-the call of
the people as well as of the states, for such legislation. It is further
submitted that, if passed, the bill should be sustained on the ground
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of harmony among the states, should the issue ever be tried before
the High Tribunal.
Economic considerations should be our premise in determining
whether or not a minimum wages and hours bill would qualify under
the harmony clause. We must show first that such a bill would op-
erate to the welfare of the whole people and not to the benefit of any
class as opposed to the interests of another class. Secondly, that a
national ruling is necessary to avoid a disharmony that will result
from leaving the matter to local legislation.
Social research should account for the first requirement, as well
as for the second. To tie the legal technics in with economic and
social needs so as to justify a national solution to this problem is the
applied science of law, as creative in its usage as the inventor who
puts into practical effect the finding of theorists.
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SYDNEY SAXON.
PRICE-FIxING AND THE FAIR TRADE ACTS.
Constitutionality of the Fair Trade Acts.
The passage by 42 state legislatures of almost identical Fair
Trade Acts represents the culmination of almost thirty years of per-
sistent striving by proponents of resale price maintenance to overcome
predatory price-cutting. It seemed, however, that all this work would
be of no avail in New York when the first resale price maintenance
contract was declared invalid by the Court of Appeals in Doubleday,
Doran & Co. v. Macy & Co.' In this case, the plaintiff publishing
company brought an action to restrain the defendant retailer (the
plaintiff publisher's vendee) from selling or offering for sale certain
books published by Doubleday, Doran & Company at a price less than
that stipulated as the retail price of such books in a contract made be-
tween such publisher and another retailer of books. Macy's defense
was that it had never had anything to do with this agreement made by
the plaintiff and the other retailer; that the stipulations as to the re-
sale price of the books of the contracting retailer could not possibly
bind Macy & Co., a stranger to this contract; and that the Fair Trade
' The writer wishes to thank Arthur L. Shapiro, St. John's Law School,
'38, for much of the editorial comment contained herein.
1269 N. Y. 272, 199 N. E. 409 (1936). See Comment (1936) 34 MicH. L.
Rav. 691; (1935) 10 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 319.
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